Introduction
Society evolves over time and law must apply to an ever-changing substratum. This has always been the case and the application of EU law to internet-related matters is no exception. 1 rights (FRs) , which also lend themselves to evolutive construction, 2 because their formulation through principles requires actualisation in particular cases. 3 FR-adjudication concerning novel technologies occurs in an epistemic scene which changes continuously. Namely, its coordinates inevitably shift along two different axes. On the one hand, technological advancement causes social practices to reconfigure and take new shapes; on the other hand, the flexible application of general principles to specific circumstances cannot be assessed statically or a priori. The process of normative refinement required to regulate these activities can take place at the legislative level and/or through legal interpretation and application, including through the activity of judicial bodies. The nature of technological advancement makes it impossible to rely on a backward-looking analysis of established general practice to build appropriate analogies for the regulation of future circumstances. To be effective, refinement must instead take the form of reformative law-making (or judicial standard-setting) rather than codification or consolidation of practice.
Whereas law cannot anticipate technological innovations, it should react to them as promptly as possible. As Advocate General Cruz Villalón noted, 'there are currently many legal categories the conception and scope of which require a reconsideration where they affect social and commercial relationships occurring on the internet.' 4 This article raises a warning against received thinking. Namely, it posits that the proportionality test -as we know it -is an inadequate heuristic device to resolve legal disputes in which fundamental The assumption that the Court performs constitutional adjudication requires a clarification. 10 Substantively, the Court reviews the compatibility of EU secondary legislation with the Treaties and international law. Fundamental rights provisions are among the primary norms which secondary legislation must respect to be valid. In the present analysis, the interpretation or validity of EU law acts 11 or national law implementing EU law turn on their compliance with fundamental rights: this kind of judicial review is, in the substance, typically constitutional. Besides the substantive affinity, the Court has also a formal mandate to engage in constitutional adjudication. Namely, it arbitrates the vertical division of powers between Member States and the Union, as domestic constitutional courts often do. 12 In particular, the review of secondary legislation for compliance with Treaty law ultimately implicates the compliance with the principle of conferral. Formally, therefore, respect of Treaty law is a safeguard against undue encroachment of Member States' competences.
This article introduces a distinction between internet-native rules and other rules that might be applicable in internet-related cases (section 2). The purpose of this distinction is to focus on the constitutional component of the Court's case-law, which is more clearly visible when it considers the compatibility of internet-native rules with fundamental rights. Section 3 uses the Google Spain case as an illustration of the shortcomings of proportionality in this field. The analysis develops in Section 4, which discusses other judgments to support the idea that the Court is less engaged in actual proportionality than in a pragmatic moderation of conflicting interests. The core argument of this future. Or, more precisely, the judge-made doctrines that I teach in my First Amendment classes seem increasingly irrelevant'. 10 work, synthesised in the conclusive section, is that the Court should let go of the proportionality parlance and expose the policy-oriented thrust of its decisions on internet-related matters.
This article does not purport to criticise proportionality in general, the use of balancing by the regulator or the generic taking into account of conflicting interests in adjudication. The narrow claim is that the three-step proportionality test is helpless to arbitrate FR-implications in internet disputes.
Möller's warning is wise: '[w]e should assess the value of proportionality not by asking whether there are cases where it does not add much, but by asking whether there are cases where it does '. 13 However, in the digital arena, proportionality is structurally unable to add anything, most of the times.
Its damage to legal reasoning far outreaches the benefit, and should be noted.
Regulatory connection of internet-native and non-internet norms
FR-adjudication inevitably entails the interpretation and application of principles. Regulation of conduct relating to the use of internet, conversely, can be very thorough and comprise detailed rules.
In fact, the EU has legislated copiously in the field. 14 The process of refinement of the nexus between EU law and internet activities has resulted in a flurry of regulation. This process has aimed to achieve, maintain and renew 'regulatory connection', 15 that is, the alignment between regulation and regulated practices. New legal disciplines have emerged governing the impact that internet technologies have on several human activities (production, distribution and consumption of information, access to intellectual products, entertainment, marketing strategies, management of personal data, use of intangible networks to support the activity of public entities judges apply rules that are not internet-specific to internet matters, regulatory connection must take place in the courtroom, more or less ad hoc.
The subject-matter of this article is the Court's constitutional case-law in the digital milieu. The cases are selected to gauge the process of evolutive refinement described above, whereby adjudication secures alignment between the digital world and a subset of EU law, i.e., its fundamental rights standards. All the disputes considered fall in a casuistic spectrum of EU applicable norms (the application of EU law is a prerequisite for the CJEU to exercise jurisdiction In the latter case, the regulatory connection hinges on the optimisation of existing rules to new practices, and the constitutional duty of the Court to monitor compliance with fundamental rights is mixed with its task to secure regulatory connection through the interpretation of non-internet rules.
Quite simply, the updated application of the rule of conduct must also respect fundamental rights. This is a routine check that the Court must perform on all EU rules. 18 Two examples illustrate this distinction, which is not clear-cut but is helpful to appreciate the Court's work. without precedents that can apply by analogy. 37 Type 1 reasoning is therefore more directly constitutional, in the limited sense explained. Its deployment is clearly visible in the application of internet-native rules, but it can be traced also when Type 2 rules apply. Simply, there can be hybrid cases where the updating of non-internet-specific rules occurs alongside, or even through, FR-based arguments appealing to the balancing discretion of the Court. If the Type 1/2 distinction is relatively clear, any case can be decoded without worrying too much about whether it is a pure example of 36 For a distinction between subsumption and balancing, and an attempt to describe the latter process as a neutral process (like the former), see Robert Alexy, 'On balancing and subsumption. A structural comparison' revolved around the potential liabilities of internet service providers for infringement of intellectual property rights and the possible application of a safe-harbour. They are exemplary of the potential for litigation in circumstances of regulatory disconnection, actual or alleged. In each case, there was a farfetched claim. In PRCA, a licensing agency claimed that the appearance of a website's content on a computer screen was, in and of itself, an instance of reproduction requiring a specific clearance for the use of any IPs contained on the website. 40 The defendant objected that the appearance on the screen of a website's content was a 'temporary act of reproduction' incidental and essential to the mere viewing of webpages, and that it was therefore exempted from the IP regime. 41 Conversely, in
Papasavvas, a news company argued that the publication its newspaper online was merely hosting and fell under the safe harbour of the e-commerce Directive (see above). Accordingly, the company claimed immunity from an action for defamation regarding articles it published online.
Obviously, the Court rejected the characterisations offered by the licensing agency in PRCA and the newspaper company in Papasavvas. Even prima facie, on-screen projection of websites cannot require a separate authorisation of IP use, and the for-profit operation of an online newspaper cannot be considered a content-neutral conduit. However, attempts were made to stretch or limit the reach of the safe harbours in the applicable Directives, in a bid to trick the Court into an adjustment of the 38 n 26. 39 n 27. 40 That is, in addition to that required to upload content on the website. The precursor in this gallery is the Lindqvist case. 45 On its face, this is a schoolbook example of a Type 2 question: update of a non-internet rule to a worldcum-internet. However, it reveals the Court's readiness to alter the balance of established principles, if only slightly. The rationale of the applied rule is to prevent that personal data be diffused where insufficient guarantees exist for their protection. If the rationale is valid, indeed, internet amplifies 13 this concern indefinitely; this much is unquestionable. The protection of the affected parties would then require Member States 'to prevent any personal data being placed on the internet.' However,
the Court discarded this conclusion as absurd, implicitly relying on a reapportioning of the responsibilities based on a new analysis of expected costs, that is, a covert utilitarian assessment.
Since anybody uploading any personal data online would likely to incur liability, this liability is lifted, even if it was effectively designed to protect a fundamental right.
Invoking arguments relating to the original intention of the legislator (that could not foresee the functioning of internet) and a sloppy reasoning ex absurdo (every uploader would be liable) the Court produced a Type 1 determination in disguise, where strict proportionality determined the outcome.
Specifically, it altered the established balance between the right to privacy and the right to impart information, acknowledging that the current social and technological situation validates an irreversible erosion of the former in favour of the latter. In a sense, this judgment has inadvertently signalled the demotion of privacy protection to a policy objective (down from fundamental right). It also raises the question whether proportionality is a valid tool to manage the impact of new technologies on fundamental rights.
Proportionality between fundamental rights in digital matters -unworkable formulae
A constant of constitutional adjudication in Europe is the use of the proportionality test to balance competing values. 47 The European Union applies a homonymous principle (alongside subsidiarity) to prevent its rules from encroaching on Member States' competences, 48 use. 49 Other intimations of the principle and other instances of balancing lato sensu (for instance, the balancing inherent in policy-making) are without the narrow scope of this critique.
Proportionality, or the process that the test entails, is a defining element of constitutionalism globally. 50 The test of proportionality is normally used to assess the justification of restrictions to fundamental rights caused by private or, more commonly, public measures. 51 A certain proportion must exist between the interference to a given right and the benefit that that interference brings to another right or public interest. Proportionality has become a general principle of EU law 52 and has informed the case-law of the ECtHR, 53 under the moniker of necessity.
Roughly, the proportionality test used by the Court traces the one developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court (the BvfG) 54 and theorised as a prototype by Robert Alexy. 55 It is a threestep test informed by the principle of Pareto-optimisation 56 ; each step ensures that the measure under scrutiny is efficient, that is, there cannot be any unnecessary waste of rights' protection. It is a device of FR-maximation. The measure must be suitable to achieve the goal it is designed for (step 1) and must be, among those equally suitable and reasonably available, the least encroaching on the right restricted (step 2). The third step, usually called proportionality stricto sensu, requires weighing the values at stake, when it is inevitable that some of them must suffer a restriction. 57 Again, the purpose is to preserve efficiency: a measure is disproportionately restrictive of a right if its contribution to the competing value is inferior to the restriction caused, in terms of intensity. The test, at a closer look, invites to a comparison between states of the world (rather than values as such): one in which the interference operates and one where it does not.
This "Disproportionality Rule" 58 is defined by the BvfG -convolutely but correctly -as follows:
An interference with a constitutional right is disproportional if it is not justified by the fact that the omission of this interference would give rise to an interference with another principle (or with the same principle with respect to other persons or in other respects), provided that this latter interference is at least as intensive as the first one. 59
The proportionality test has been for decades the Court's tool of choice to deliver judgments in hard cases without forfeiting its legitimacy. Proportionality's high level of proceduralisation and its operation reminiscent of a mathematical formula facilitate the thankless task to second-guess Member States' preferences and review EU law's compliance with FRs. This section discusses the use of proportionality and FR-adjudication in selected judgments. Google claimed that it did not, because it only performed a content-blind indexing of all words uploaded online, to populate search results for its users. 62 The Advocate General, after a short reflection on how internet has taken EU law by surprise, 63 advocated a 'rule of reason' akin to the Lindqvist rationale. 64 Drawing support from the Article 29 Working Party reports, he concluded that holding Google responsible for the managing of personal data on the webpages listed would lead to absurd results. 65 The Advocate General's approach is indeed reminiscent of Lindqvist: subsumption (the application of the Directive to Google's acts) is determined through a reasoning ex absurdo regarding practical consequences. Regulatory connection is managed through proportionality: Type 1 and Type 2 are entangled. The Court instead rejected Google's argument that its listing entailed an automated processing without meaningful editorial intervention. 66 Google, by indexing online data, performs a deliberate commercial activity that can attract liability. Accordingly, Google is a controller under the Directive (a Type 2 finding). 67 The openly constitutional reasoning, however, is deployed in the Type 1 part of the judgment. The
Court laid the groundwork for its determination noting that the outcome, seemingly framed as a question of principle, depended on the context. Quite simply, information loaded online is too readily available, to anyone. Availability of truthful information published lawfully has become a problemnot a matter of concern in pre-internet times. 68 Now, instead, regulation is required to manage the negative externalities of this information overload. This is partly due to how good online search engines are: information is only as public as search engines makes it accessible.
The Court concluded that the search provider is a controller which processes personal data.
Therefore, if Google refuses to remove certain links from the results of a name-based search upon request, State regulatory agencies can review the application and order the removal. 69 This order can be granted when the results of a search entail an excessive interference in the data subject's private life, without a concurring (and overriding) justification. Because time soothes out some of the available justifications based on public interest, this finding was saluted as establishing a 'right to be forgotten.'
The resulting instruction of the Court, which read into the applicable rules of the Directive a specific duty (for the controller) and a right (for the data subject), stems from an overt use of proportionality.
The passage where the reasoning of the CJEU reveals the use of proportionality stricto sensu calls for closer analysis:
As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the
Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general 68 Ibid, para 80: 'It must be pointed out at the outset that … processing of personal data, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, carried out by the operator of a search engine is liable to affect significantly the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data when the search by means of that engine is carried out on the basis of an individual's name, since that processing enables any internet user to obtain through the list of results a structured overview of the information relating to that individual that can be found on the internet -information which potentially concerns a vast number of aspects of his private life and which, without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could have been only with great difficultyand thereby to establish a more or less detailed profile of him. Furthermore, the effect of the interference with those rights of the data subject is heightened on account of the important role played by the internet and search engines in modern society, which render the information contained in such a list of results ubiquitous.' 69 Balancing four rights is a devilish task even if we assume, for the sake of ease, that a given measure
x can only either respect or breach each of them (that is, we disregard the degree of contribution to the achievement of each right and the intensity of the breach thereof 71 83 This is one step further from the AG's remark that 'the universal scope of the information contributes to the harm being potentially more acute than that suffered, for example, by means of a conventional medium' (see eDate n 4, para 48).
In the folds of the Court's reasoning lays the idea that, in a context of obsolescence of public authorities, Google must operate as a quasi-public authority. 84 Therefore, it has non-reciprocal and non-contractual obligations towards its stakeholders (both the users and the persons affected by its activity). Alternatively, Google's duties can be framed as a regulatory brace imposed on a quasimonopolistic actor with predominant power over information and public opinion. 85 duties to Google is perhaps reasonable, but given the circumstances it would be preferable that the regulator had done that 88 or that the Court had appealed to the reasonableness of the decision, rather than to its putative proportionality.
Low-intensity actions with momentous reach. Protecting collateral victims of internet measures
Proportionality does not compare values, but marginal variations of value-realisation entailed by alternative states of the world (induced or mandated by identified normative measures). However, as argued in the previous section, internet-based activities do not lend themselves to the intuitive generalisations that allow reviewers to attach quantitative judgments to the realisation of rights.
Deprived of workable comparisons, proportionality misses its critical hinge. 88 Shapiro n 81, 225.
This difficulty was prefigured in Lindqvist (where the low-intensity threat to privacy was multiplied by the accessibility of online content, causing a formal disproportion that required a policy-oriented ruling). A less risky assessment was necessary in Schecke. 89 impossible to strike a balance that is acceptable to all people whose fundamental rights are affected.
In short, any regulation of the activity 'using internet' is inevitably over-inclusive with respect to the regulatory goal pursued. It is as if all people 'breathing' were required to avoid drinking, just because all drivers are certainly 'breathers'. Unfortunately, there seems to be no better way to circumscribe internet regulation ratione personae or ratione materiae. As a result, proportionate balancing is normally and demonstrably impossible to achieve; all solutions are disproportionate. This is so since internet-regulating measures have such a massive inefficiency-creating externality (i.e., they create useless restrictions for users whose action is irrelevant to the regulatory purpose pursued) that it is impossible to prove their proportionality. Hence, it is often impossible to demonstrate that internet regulations -let alone court decisions -arbitrating between competing rights secure an overall positive balance of right-enjoyment compared to the status quo. As a consequence, it is the task of the regulator to deliberately assess the various trade-offs, none of which is proportionate in the sense implicated by the proportionality test, and choose the preferable norms as a matter of conscious policy-making.
To its credit, the findings of the Court are rarely the strained result of an impracticable review of proportionality. More commonly, they reflect indeed a policy choice, 95 often dictated by the concern of avoiding false positives and minimise the number of stakeholders whose interest is sacrificed in the trade-off. The Court in Lindqvist spared billions of web-users from the regime applicable to those who transfer personal information to third countries. In Google Spain, the Court operated similarly: when the individual's concern is plausible, Google's duty to act upon it is the more convenient option, as 95 Endicott n 6, (referring to judges using proportionality): 'They assess the value of pursuing public purposes in the way that the legislature or the government has done or proposes to do'. opposed to sacrificing her fundamental right, or asking the news outlet to retract a lawful exercise of the freedom to impart information. This idea of (utilitarian) convenience is candidly spelled out in the preamble of Directive 2001/29 96 on copyright protection in the information society:
In the digital environment … the services of intermediaries may increasingly be used by third parties for infringing activities. In many cases such intermediaries are best placed to bring such infringing activities to an end. Therefore, without prejudice to any other sanctions and remedies eBay revealed the identity of the seller, who denied involvement in the specific transaction. The purchaser then required the bank with which the seller held an account (registered with eBay) to disclose the holder's identity. The bank refused, invoking banking secrecy. The Court was asked to determine whether EU law allows banking secrecy to be upheld at the expense of IP protection, 99 and set out to 'reconcile the requirements of the protection of different fundamental rights, namely the right to an effective remedy and the right to intellectual property, on the one hand, and the right to protection of personal data.' 100 The Court held that a domestic law authorising banks to invoke banking secrecy unconditionally can frustrate disproportionally the rights to intellectual property -by making it impossible to pursue an effective remedy in case of breach. 101
The outcome resulted from a plain application of the proportionality test. The domestic law was considered capable of obliterating even the essence of the rights to property and to an effective remedy, in breach of Article 52(1) of the Charter. This decision differs from L'Oréal because the incidence of internet on the dispute was accidental. The dispute was between the bank and the purchaser, and the interests involved were just two: 'First, the right to information and, second, the right to protection of personal data must be complied with.' 102 This case, in short, did not display some of the common features of those disputes in which internet activities are central, and which for this reason escape moderation through proportionality.
The mythology of proportionality pervades also the cases concerning infringements of IP rights through peer-to-peer online activities. In the main proceedings, the IP-owners (directly or through dedicated associations) required, alternatively, that internet providers disclose their customers' identity (Promusicae; Bonnier) or monitor their activity so as to prevent infringements (SABAM;
Scarlet). The Court, in all cases, resorted diffusely to a constitutional reasoning, claiming to consider all fundamental rights involved. Generally, several rights of several subjects were at stake: the property rights of IP-holders and their right to seek judicial protection thereof, the right to conduct business of the internet service providers, the right to privacy and to exchange information of the internet users (the latter arising only in the monitoring-related cases).
According to the arguments presented so far, the essential matrix of these cases is sufficient to redoubt of their compatibility with the orthodox three-step proportionality routine. A short account confirms the doubts as meritorious.
In Promusicae, the Court recalled that it is the Member States' duty to implement a Directive choosing measures which strike 'a fair balance' between the various fundamental rights and respect proportionality. 103 The Court confirmed this guideline in Bonnier, adding that an order for disclosure of personal data is not precluded if, among other things, 'the reasons for the measure outweigh the nuisance or other harm which the measure may entail for the person affected by it or for some other conflicting interest'. 104 These guidelines are very vague and pass the buck to the national authorities, which are better positioned to assess the fairness of the balance in specific cases. This implicitly challenges the idea that there is only one balanced option, to be identified through proportionality testing.
In SABAM and Scarlet, the Court mixed subsumption and proportionality. It plainly stated that the sought-after filtering systems would require the internet service providers to carry out general monitoring, in breach of the e-commerce Directive. 105 It then stressed certain characters of the filtering system (costly, permanent, complicated) that automatically made it unnecessarily burdensome 106 and patently unable to strike a fair balance between the rights of IP-holders and internet providers. 107 The rights of the users were mentioned only ad abundantiam. This finding is 103 Ibid, para 70. 104 impossible to square with an orthodox proportionality test. The Court simply noticed that an obligation to monitor would impose a significant burden on internet providers, without elaborating on the degree of benefit that it would bring to property rights. Nor did the decisions account for the FR-balance of the preferable scenario (ample freedom of conducting business coupled by widespread disrespect of IP rights). There is not even a hint of comparison on which to hang a proper finding of proportionality. Likewise, the Court produced a cringeworthy non sequitur when it stated that requiring providers to set up 'a complicated, costly, permanent computer system … would also be contrary to [the requirement] that measures … should not be unnecessarily complicated or costly'. 108
Nothing in the Court's reasoning supported the conclusion that the measure was stricto sensu disproportionate, let alone unnecessary (that is, wasteful) in light of its purpose.
In sum, these peer-to-peer cases show that the Court either delegated proportionality to domestic courts or recited its elements as if it were a half-forgotten due diligence checklist. It is not preposterous to suggest that the findings were not truly reached through proportionality, and that it was just cited to inject legitimacy ex post deciso.
In another case (UPC 109 ), the intermediary was not eBay, and the alleged IP infringement was not camouflaged among millions of innocent ads. The intermediary, an internet provider, was ordered by a national court to block the users' access to a website streaming pirated movies. In this dispute, the possibility of a blanket shutdown did not trouble the Court: the website was clearly up to no good, hence there was no risk of false positives being unfairly affected by the injunction. The balancing with the hypothetical countervailing rights was briefly accounted as follows:
… in order to prevent the fundamental rights recognised by EU law from precluding the adoption of an injunction such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the national procedural rules must provide a possibility for internet users to assert their rights before the court once the implementing measures taken by the internet service provider are known. 110
Even in a case like Schecke, where the outcome is based on a proper proportionality analysis (to the point that the Court assessed the necessity of the measure challenged, and suggested a less restrictive alternative), 111 the underlying problem was more mundane. Because any information on internet receives a disproportionate exposure, anything uploaded beyond the strict necessary breaches somebody's rights significantly, even when the additional disclosure is not particularly harmful in and of itself.
The fragmentation of practical responsibility for the downstream consequence of online conduct is difficult to decipher with certainty. Resultantly, the vast disproportion that can occur (in size, timespan, reach, effects, harmfulness) between conduct and events makes it impossible to apportion legal responsibility according to a principled scheme, like that resulting from the proportionality test.
The northern star of the Court seems the minimisation of costs, something very different from the maximisation of rights that proportionality promises. Responsibility is regularly attributed to those who suffer the least from bearing it. Slippery slopes are regularly shunned, a pragmatic result that betrays the Court's preference for sustainability over principles. There seems to be a twist, however, which confirms the impossibility to refer to a unique method of balancing: millions of internet users are allowed to sell goods (L'Oréal) and exchange files (SABAM) freely, even if this relatively unregulated practice occasionally encroaches the rights of private individuals. When at stake is a public interest, instead, the focus shifts, and the priority becomes defusing internet's multiplying effect of disorderly conduct. The Court held in Carmen Media Group:
a prohibition measure covering any offer of games of chance via the internet may, in principle, be regarded as suitable for pursuing the legitimate objectives of preventing incitement to squander money on gambling, combating addiction to the latter and protecting young persons, even though the offer of such games remains authorised through more traditional channels. 112 An apparent exception to this very pragmatic approach is the case Digital Rights v. Ireland, 113 in which the Court annulled the Data Retention directive, in a flamboyant exercise of proportionality testing.
However, the Court maybe tried a bit too hard to sell this decision as an fearless application of proportionality. Consider the following statement, relating to the minimum period for which telecommunications operators must retain the data:
that period is set at between a minimum of 6 months and a maximum of 24 months, but it is not stated that the determination of the period of retention must be based on objective criteria in order to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly necessary. 114
This remark purports to prove too much: why should an EU Directive specify that its application must In truth, it is plausible to concede that the Directive was probably badly drafted, and that a tighter wording with respect to the FR-implications could help Member States to implement it appropriately, achieving more coherence across the Union. Ultimately, the inefficient (i.e., disproportionate) measures were the national implementing acts but the Court, perhaps knowing that the Directive would necessarily need an overhaul in any event, applied the proportionality directly to it, in a display of righteousness that conveyed the notion that the EU is under a rule of FR-law and the Court is ready to enforce it unceremoniously.
As for the proportionality test itself, this case was relatively simple, with essentially two interests in tension: the privacy of the data subjects and the public security. 116 The duty of telecommunication providers to retain personal information was in fact a mere exception to the former for the benefit of the latter, not an autonomous element for the balancing. In essence, the dispute hinged on the regulatory limits of the exception. Using the privacy-restrictive scenario allowed (if not required) by the Directive as the status quo baseline, the Court performed an approximate proportionality analysis.
The Court employed several degree-qualifying terms, which seemed to set the scene for an intensity-assessment. Protection of personal data plays an 'important role' and the Directive causes a 'serious' interference, hence the Court's judicial review thereon 'should be strict' 117 ; moreover, the fight against organised crime and terrorism is 'of the utmost importance'. 118 The suitability of data retention -in general -for the purposes of fighting crime went uncontested, 119 but the necessity of its limitation under the Directive -in particular -was very much contestable. The Court even noted that 'derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data must apply only in so 116 That the Directive's goal was certified as being the protection of public order and security is another point of possible contention. The Directive, indeed, was adopted under the first pillar as a measure providing for the harmonisation of national rules, aimed at the removal of obstacles to the realisation of a common market of services. This economic goal, the only official one, was somewhat side-lined in the Court's analysis favour of the second-level purpose (the 'material objective') of facilitating the fight against crime, see Digital Rights Ireland n 113, para 41. 117 Ibid, para 48, emphases added. 118 Ibid, para 51, emphasis added. 119 126 Ibid, paras 60-62. 127 Ibid, paras 63-64. 128 Ibid, para 65.
The Court held as much implicitly, noting the Directive's over-inclusiveness. However, it is fair to suppose that narrowing down the scope of the retention to an optimal level was a difficult task, hence it could not be assumed that simply because the Directive balance appeared unfortunate a better solution was readily available: perhaps it was not. Possibly, requiring that retention only occur when the conduct of the persons involved is suspicious might delimit the investigation and undermine its effectiveness. Likewise, the indication that the time-range for the period of retention is excessive should have come with a cost-benefit analysis of alternative ranges, or additional criteria to narrow the range down domestically. In short, there is no hint of real comparison in the Court's reasoning, which reveals that the Court itself (never mind this author) did not take proportionality seriously either. 129 In the landmark decision MGM v Gronkster, the US Supreme Court was called to address the liability of internet service providers managing a peer-to-peer platform. 130 The Supreme Court frankly evaluated the interests at stake and the wider policies (how to prevent technology from fostering disdain for intellectual property; how to set a liability regime that does not hinder technology it had contained an artificial calculation of the weight of the interests involved and an impressionistic comparison of the aggregate weight corresponding to the different rules of liability discussed.
Proportionality is the result of a good decision, not the other way round.
Conclusions
The Court is couching its decisions in the familiar jargon used in the balancing of fundamental rights. This is understandable, but the recurrent use of proportionality does not evince a fil rouge of the caselaw, nor does it ensure better or more predictable decisions. Sometimes, proportionality is hardly recognisable when its use is announced, emptied as it is of any substance. Proportionality balancing as such would made sense only if one hoped to find a point of equilibrium, the end of a zero-sum game, where any other alternative would be wrong (because comparatively unbalanced). This aspiration is futile in the field of internet activities, where various recurring features advise against using proportionality balancing as a heuristic tool.
Namely, balancing often occurs between three or more groups of stakeholders and three or more different rights; 134 lawful conduct can result in harmful effects that are difficult to gauge factually and that, by virtue of the online-multiplier, are hypothetically immense; sweeping judicial precedents are likely to affect adversely innocent subjects; very rarely can all rights be preserved through Paretooptimising balancing.
The challenge for the Court, in these conditions, is to let go of the comfortable terminology/mythology on proportionality and allocate liability with policy-oriented pragmatism, as it does regularly but covertly. Ultimately, however, the refinement of legal categories cannot be entrusted to the Court alone: the incoming regulatory reform of the field is bound to provide more guidance (and more precise rules) to judges and EU citizens alike. Regulatory connection with FRexternalities should not be routinely entrusted courts. Regulators should translate the preferences of society regarding technology and take responsibility for choosing a regime that will ineluctably entail an indecipherable FR-balance sheet. Governments are allowed and required to make decisions in circumstances of radical uncertainties, where beneficial and detrimental effects of a policy cannot be proved. 135 Difficult choices must be made, possibly outside courtrooms:
…to rely on courts to rescue legislation can sometimes undermine the integrity of legal reasoning.
In the interests of regulatory legitimacy and democracy, where a technology has out-run its regulatory framework, it might be important to take time out to debate the developments that have taken place and to determine how the regulatory framework should be adjusted. Sometimes, the social licence for a particular technology needs to be reviewed and revised. 136 Granted, abandoning the FR-metrical discourse in favour of policy-oriented adjudication would have its own risks. La Torre rightly noted that if 'fundamental rights are seen as policies, they will … lose their point, which is controlling and limiting State action.' 137 However, limiting the exercise of public authority is hardly the most pressing problem of the regulation of internet-related conduct, for the simple reason that public authority is already comparatively weaker in this field. What needs urgent management are the interplay between private rights and private interests, and the public policy inputs necessary to arbitrate or moderate between them. The Google Spain and L'Oréal cases are, in this sense, illustrative of how the difficulty does not 135 Endicott n 6. 136 Brownsword n 15, 266. The Author also notes (ibid., 258) that different regulators might opt for different solutions, depending on the priorities they set (for instance, utilitarianism versus human dignity). 137 lie in the nature of public interference into private conduct, but in the sustainability of a reciprocal arrangement between human activities with numerous externalities.
Ultimately, it is proposed here to discard the 'mathematical' proportionality championed by Alexy, which has provided the Court for too long with a comfort-zone where anything goes, in terms of legal argumentation. If the motivation of the Court's decisions is after all policy-oriented, there is no plausible benefit in their disguise as proportionality calculi. Google Spain is a pragmatical apportionment of duties, so is L'Oréal v eBay and to a large extent the other IP-related cases perused above. The outlier cases are not symptomatic: UPC spurs from the matter-of-fact consideration that the website's conduct was prima facie illegal; Digital Rights Ireland was really a revise-and-resubmit note to the EU legislator with a perfunctory proportionality recitation.
Certainly, more cases in the future will decide digital cases through lip-serving references to proportionality. This knee-jerk trend is a disservice to the rule of law and obfuscates the legal reasoning of the Court, because internet disputes are bound to fit uncomfortably in the proportionality straitjacket. Better, the proportionality test is bound to fit too loose or too tight on internet-based realities. Ad hoc adjustments are routinely necessary, to the point that it is not clear anymore why courts should stick to a test that systematically needs à la carte stretching.
Habermas criticised proportionality balancing for undermining the claim to correctness of adjudication of principles. Proportionality-based reasoning, in short, would not reflect the legal categories of right and wrong, but the policy categories of adequateness and opportunity, thus depriving FRs of their status of legal principles. 138 Alexy's rebuttal is convincing, in general:
proportionality is better than nothing. The three-step test, in fact, envisages 'abundant criteria to label a proposition as correct or incorrect' 139 : it provides an articulate template for judicial reasoning (a
